August 08, 2007

So, DESI's not all that secure. Who'd have thought...

BradBlog recently visited the Diebold Election Systems, Inc. facility in Allen and found out that election equipment was anything but secure. Big shocker there. They also take the time to look into the he said/she said between CA and DESI regarding Cali's decertification of DESI's shitty election systems. And that's the real funny...

But Diebold's never been one to let the truth stand in the way of making a buck and saving their asses. Here's the knowingly misleading statement [PDF] released by Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI), including these choice quotes from President Dave Byrd on the morning after Bowen's announcement (and on the day of our friendly visit to Diebold):
"Secretary Bowen’s top-to-bottom review was designed to ignore security procedures and protocols that are used during every election. Her team of hackers was given unfettered access to the equipment, the source code, and all other information on security features provided by DESI to the Secretary of State's office. And she refused to include in the review the current version of DESI’s touch screen software with enhanced security features."

"Local election officials in California have put in place proper policies and procedures which compliment the security features of DESI’s voting solutions."

Good lord. Aren't there any paid journalists out there who can dispatch this kind of horseshit? Guess not. So quickly:

A) Bowen's "team of hackers" (actually, not hackers at all, but teams of some of the most respected computer scientists and security experts in the world) was not given any more access than Mr. Byrd or Mr. Bear has.

B) They did not have access to the source code. You might want to read Bowen's decertification/recertification documents [PDF] for your own voting machines where she clearly states same. Just an example or two from those docs [emphasis added for easier viewing by the Byrds and Bears and paid journalists]...
[W]ithout requiring access to Diebold source code, the Diebold Red Team members gained 'root access' to the voting system that allowed manipulation of every setting on the networking devices and on the election management server system...and...without accessing Diebold source code, were able to violate the physical security of every aspect of the TSx direct recording electronic voting machine under polling place conditions using tools found in a typical office.

C) She did not "refuse to review the current version of DESI’s touch screen software with enhanced security features." As you know, this was a "Top-to-Bottom Review" of previously certified voting systems in CA. Your "enhanced security features" were not a part of that previously certified system. But as long as you bring it up, what are those "enhanced security features" needed for? You've been telling us for years that your systems used in many previous CA elections --- without your "enhanced security features" --- were perfectly secure? It's almost as if you were...lying or something?

YOU SUCK, DIEBOLD. You're LOSERS. Either get out of the 'elections tabulation systems' market or sac up and design systems that are secure and work. Whatever you do, please stop whining.

Posted by mcblogger at August 8, 2007 02:12 PM

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